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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE "PLAIN MEANING" OF
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: A REVIEW OF RECENT
AND PENDING SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
LOWELL P. BOTrRELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy law has changed drastically in the last fourteen
years-from the revision of the Bankruptcy Code (Code) in 1978'
to the 1982 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe-
line Co. 2 decision of the United States Supreme Court. The Code
was subsequently rewritten in 1984 a and again in 1986.4 The
changes in 1984 were not as sweeping as the 1978 changes, and
the subsequent legislative changes have not been as traumatic as
the 1978 revisions.
This article will address the recent United States Supreme
Court decisions of import to those practicing in bankruptcy. The
recent judicial decisions in this area have had a major impact upon
litigation, distribution and reorganization in bankruptcy. Some of
these changes have had as wide ranging of an effect as the changes
of the Code in 1978. The article will also address cases that are
pending before the Supreme Court which will undoubtedly have
an impact upon bankruptcy law.
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1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330).
2. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
3. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333 (1984).
4. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustee and Family Farmer Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
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II. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. AN INDIVIDUAL, ALTHOUGH NOT ENGAGED IN
BUSINESS, MAY NEVERTHELESS BE A CHAPTER 11
DEBTOR
The Supreme Court in Toibb v. Radloff5 addressed the issue of
whether an individual who is not directly engaged in business may
nevertheless be a debtor under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code.' In Toibb, the debtor originally filed for relief under Chap-
ter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. At the time he filed
the action, the debtor was an unemployed energy consultant. The
debtor owned approximately twenty-four percent of a corporation
known as Independence Electric Corporation (IEC). Additionally,
he formerly had been employed as an energy consultant for IEC
but had lost his employment prior to the bankruptcy filing.7 At
the time of filing, the debtor had unsecured obligations in excess of
$100,0008 and some priority tax liability.' He failed to claim the
stock that he owned in IEC as exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522,
asserting that the market value of the stock was unknown. 10 The
trustee pursued an offer by the corporation to repurchase the
debtor's shares for $25,000.11 The debtor, realizing that the shares
would be liquidated, converted the case to a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy, which the court approved. The debtor subsequently filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of reorganization.' 2 Under the plan,
the debtor proposed to pay the creditors the value of the IEC
stock less administrative expenses and priority tax claims, and in
addition thereto, proposed to pay them fifty percent of any
declared dividends from the IEC stock in the six years following
confirmation. 13
The bankruptcy court, on its own motion, ordered the debtor
to show cause why his petition should not be dismissed since he
5. 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991).
6. Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2198 (1991).
7. Id. at 2198.
8. Id. Toibb involved unsecured debts of $170,605. Id. This amount of debt exceeded
the Chapter 13 debt limits and is most likely the reason the debtor eventually filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. With Congress's proposal to increase the debt limitation for
Chapter 13 bankruptcies, this type of case may not be seen again. Further, there are-
questions as to whether or not this debtor could ever confirm a plan of reorganization under
Chapter 11, given the "Absolute Priority Rule" provided for by § 1 129(bX2XB) and the
strong voting powers of unsecured creditors.
9. Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2198.
10. Id. The debtor also listed a possible claim against his former business associates at
IEC and claimed its value as unknown. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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was not engaged in business. 14 The debtor argued that Chapter 11
should be available to "individuals" even though they were not
engaged in business. Citing the controlling Eighth Circuit prece-
dent of Wamsganz v. Boatmen's Bank of De Soto, l5  the bank-
ruptcy court ruled that the debtor was not able to seek the relief
under Chapter 11 because he was not engaged in a business. 16
The district court, relying on the same precedent, upheld the
bankruptcy court's decision. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held
that the bankruptcy court could, sua sponte,'7 dismiss the proceed-
ings, and therefore, the court upheld the decision based upon
Wamsganz. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed."'
The Supreme Court, in a strict constructionist mode, held that
the "plain language of the Bankruptcy Code disposes of the ques-
tion before us." 9 The Court applied its "plain meaning" doctrine
to the statutory provisions and definitions of §§ 109 and 101 of the
Code. The Court held that a person not engaged in business was
entitled to file under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 in light of the fact
that a "person" is defined under the Code to include an "individ-
ual."2 ° The Court noted that there was no ongoing business
requirement for a reorganization under Chapter 11.21 In a sting-
ing rebuke of the Eighth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court
opined that "we are loath to infer the exclusion of certain classes of
14. Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2198.
15. 804 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1986). In Wamsganz, the debtors filed a petition under
Chapter 13, but the petition was subsequently dismissed. The debtors then filed a petition
for relief under Chapter 11. At the time they filed their Chapter 11 petition, the debtors
were indebted to Boatmen's Bank of De Soto, a lienholder on their residential property.
Boatmen's moved to dismiss, arguing that the debtors could not qualify for relief under
Chapter 11 since they were not engaged in a business. The Circuit Court agreed and held
that the debtors never contended that they owned a business enterprise, but rather
indicated that their income was derived solely from social security, pensions, and rental
property. The court noted that several courts disagreed with the position that relief was
not available to debtors under Chapter 11 if they were not engaged in business.
Wamsganz, 804 F.2d at 504. The court stated that "[a]lthough chapter 11 contains no
explicit limitation excluding persons not engaged in business, those courts have relied upon
the purpose of chapter 11, as reflected in its legislative history, and on the provisions of
chapter 11 itself to find such a limitation." Id. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits and numerous other courts which have held that Chapter 11 relief is not
available to persons not engaged in business because the legislative history evidenced
Congress' intent to make Chapter 11 unavailable to persons not engaged in business. Id. at
505.
16. Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2199 (citing Wamsganz v. Boatmen's Bank of Desoto, 804 F.2d
503 (8th Cir. 1986)).
17. Id. (citing In re Toibb, 902 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1990)).
18. Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2199.
19. Id.
20. Id. Section 101(35) provides that a " 'person' includes [an] individual, partnership,
and corporation... " 11 U.S.C. § 101(35) (1988) (emphasis supplied).
21. Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2199.
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debtors from the protections of Chapter 11, because Congress took
care in § 109 to specify who qualifies-and who does not qualify-
as a debtor under the various chapters of the Code.""2 Specifically,
the Supreme Court held:
Section 109(b) expressly excludes from the coverage of
Chapter 7 railroads and various financial and insurance
institutions. Only municipalities are eligible for the pro-
tection of Chapter 9. § 109(c). Most significantly, § 109(d)
makes stockbrokers and commodity brokers ineligible for
Chapter 11 relief, but otherwise leaves that Chapter
available to any other entity eligible for protection of
Chapter 7. Congress knew how to restrict recourse to the
avenues of bankruptcy relief; it did not place Chapter 11
reorganization beyond the reach of a nonbusiness individ-
ual debtor.23
Mr. James Hamilton, as amicus curiae in support of affirming the
circuit court's decision, argued that the legislative history sup-
ported the lower court's reasoning.2 4 Mr. Hamilton further
asserted that the structure of Chapter 11 clearly indicated a con-
gressional intention that only business debtors qualify for relief
under this particular chapter.25
The Supreme Court found these arguments unpersuasive for a
number of reasons .2  First, the Court noted that courts should not
resort to legislative history when the statutory language is clear.2 7
The Court stated that the statutory language of § 109 was clear,
and therefore, there was no need to resort to legislative history in
order to interpret the statute.28
Next, the Court indicated that the fact that many provisions of
the Code refer to ongoing business debtors, in and of itself, did not
preclude consumer debtors from filing for protection under Chap-
ter 11. As an example, the Court indicated that § 1102 refers to an
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2200. Mr. Hamilton echoed the Eighth Circuit in Wamsganz which held that
"[t]he legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, taken as a whole, shows that Congress
meant for Chapter 11 to be available to businesses and persons engaged in business, and not
to consumer debtors." Id. at 2200 (quoting Wamsganz, 804 F.2d at 505).
The United States Trustee supported the debtor's arguments to the Court, and the
Court appointed an amicus curiae to support the judgment. Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2199 n.4.
The amicus curiae appointed was Mr. James Hamilton of Washington, D.C., a member of
the Supreme Court Bar. Id.
25. Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2200.
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984)).
28. Id. at 2200.
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equity security holders' committee, and § 1104 deals with the
appointment of a trustee "for cause, including fraud, dishonesty,
incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the
debtor by current management .... ",29 The Court concluded:
It does not follow, however, that a debtor whose affairs do
not warrant recourse to these provisions is ineligible for
Chapter 11 relief. Instead, these provisions-like the ref-
erences to debtor business in the Chapter's legislative his-
tory-reflect an understandable expectation that Chapter
11 would be used primarily by debtors with ongoing busi-
ness; they do not constitute an additional prerequisite for
Chapter 11 eligibility beyond those established in
§ 109(d).30
The Court's analysis did not stop there, however, even though
it had disposed of the question presented. The Court went on to
consider Mr. Hamilton's contentions that policy considerations
underlying the Code supported the inference that the congres-
sional intent was to preclude a nonbusiness debtor from reorganiz-
ing under Chapter 11. 3 1
First, Mr. Hamilton contended that bringing a consumer
debtor within the scope of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy did not serve
the congressional purpose of providing business debtors with the
opportunity to reorganize and restructure debts in order to save
jobs and protect investors. The Court noted that this argument
assumed Congress intended a single purpose of Chapter 11;32 this
is certainly not the case, since Chapter 11 bankruptcy does have
an underlying policy of maximizing return to the creditors. The
Court concluded: "Under certain circumstances a consumer
debtor's estate will be worth more if reorganized under Chapter
11 than if liquidated under Chapter 7. Allowing such a debtor to
proceed under Chapter 11 serves the congressional purpose of
deriving as much value as possible from the debtor's estate. '33
Second, Mr. Hamilton argued that to allow an individual to
proceed under Chapter 11 would allow the individual to have non-
exempt assets and disposable income shielded from creditors.34
Mr. Hamilton claimed that such a result would mean greater pro-
29. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1104(aXl) (1988)).
30. Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2200.
31. Id. at 2201.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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tection than that afforded under Chapter 13, which does not per-
mit the debtor to retain disposable income. The Court indicated
that the differences in the chapters and the requirements therein
reflected "Congress' appreciation that various approaches are nec-
essary to address effectively the disparate situations of debtors
seeking protection under the Code." 35 Moreover, the Court found
that Chapter 11 affords protection to creditors in that they can
object to the plan if they do not receive as much as they would
receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. The Court concluded that
"[a]bsent some showing of harm to the creditors of a nonbusiness
debtor allowed to reorganize under Chapter 11, we see nothing in
the allocation of 'burdens' and 'benefits' of Chapter 11 that war-
rants an inference that Congress intended to exclude a consumer
debtor from its coverage. "36
Third, Mr. Hamilton argued that to allow a consumer to reor-
ganize under Chapter 11 would cause a significant burden on an
already severely burdened bankruptcy court system. The Court
found this argument unfounded for two separate reasons: The
great expense and complexity of a Chapter 11 will disway most
consumer debtors from seeking relief under that chapter; and
additionally, Chapter 11 provisions give bankruptcy judges the
authority to dismiss cases that the courts determine to be
unworkable.3 8
Finally, Mr. Hamilton argued that to allow consumer debtors
to file under Chapter 11 would permit creditors to file involuntary
bankruptcies against those consumers, which is in contravention of
Congress' intent to prevent involuntary Chapter 13 provisions
against consumers.39 The Court found this concern to be over-
stated. The Court noted that "[i]f an involuntary Chapter 11
debtor fails to cooperate, this likely will provide the requisite
35. Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2201. This difference in chapters is obvious when one
compares the Chapter 12 provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1225 to the Chapter 11 provisions of 11
U.S.C. § 1111(b) and 11 U.S.C. § 1129(bX2XB). In its enactment of Chapter 12, Congress
clearly avoided placing the stringent requirements of the absolute priority rule and the
111 l(b) election requirements upon a Chapter 12 debtor, because it would make it nearly
impossible for a Chapter 12 debtor to confirm a plan. Additionally, Congress' enactment of
Chapter 12 did not put the adequate protection requirements on a Chapter 12 farm debtor
that exist in Chapter 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 1205 (1988). Thus, it is clear that Congress
anticipated different treatment under different sections of the Code.
36. Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2201.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2201-02. Section 303(a) provides in part as follows: "An involuntary case may
be commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, and only against a person. . . that
may be a debtor under the chapter under which such case is commenced." 11 U.S.C.
§ 303(a) (1988).
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'cause' for the bankruptcy court to convert the Chapter 11 case to
one under Chapter 7."40 The Court further stated that this "argu-
ment overlooks Congress' primary concern about a debtor's being
forced into bankruptcy under Chapter 13: that such a debtor,
whose future wages are not exempt from the bankruptcy estate,
§ 1322(aX 1), would be compelled to toil for the benefit of creditors
in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment's involuntary servitude
prohibition."'" The Court concluded that because there is no
comparable provision in Chapter 11 requiring debtors to pay their
future wages to the plan, the involuntary servitude argument used
in the Chapter 13 is not relevant to the Chapter 11 proceedings.4"
Thus, a debtor need not be engaged in business in order to be
afforded the benefits of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
B. A DEBTOR MAY Now FILE A "CHAPTER 20"-A
CHAPTER 7 FOLLOWED BY A CHAPTER 13
The Supreme Court in Johnson v. Home State Bank43 held
that a mortgage lien could be restructured in a Chapter 13 reor-
ganization after the underlying debt is discharged in a Chapter
7.44 In Johnson, the debtor granted Home State Bank a mortgage
on farm property in order to secure a promissory note of $470,000.
Subsequently, the debtor defaulted on the notes and foreclosure
proceedings were instituted by Home State Bank.45 During the
pendency of the foreclosure proceedings, the debtor filed a Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy and discharged his personal liability to the credi-
tor.46 After the Chapter 7 discharge, the bank proceeded to
foreclose on its real estate mortgage.47
Before the foreclosure sale was scheduled, the debtor filed a
Chapter 13 petition and listed the bank's mortgage on the farm
real estate as a claim against the estate. The debtor proposed to
pay the bank on the mortgage over four annual installments, cou-
pled with a final balloon payment equal in total value to the bank's
in rem judgment. 48 The bankruptcy court confirmed the Chapter
40. Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2202. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1988).
41. Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2202.
42. Id.
43. 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
44. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 2152 (1991).
45. Id. at 2152.
46. Id. See 111 U.S.C. § 727 (1988). Section 727 discharges the debtor of personal
liability on the debt listed in the schedules. See id.
47. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2152. The Court opined that since this foreclosure
proceeding was an in rem proceeding, the proceeding was not a violation of the debtor's
continuing injunction provisions upon discharge. Id.
48. Id.
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13 reorganization plan over the bank's objection. The bank
appealed the decision to the district court on several grounds, 49
but its primary contention was that the indebtedness could not be
reorganized under Chapter 13 because the Bankruptcy Code does
not allow a debtor to include in a Chapter 13 plan a mortgage to
secure an obligation that has been discharged in a Chapter 7 pro-
ceeding.50 The district court accepted the bank's argument5 that
the claim could not be reorganized under Chapter 13 and
reversed the bankruptcy court.
On review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the district court.5 2 The circuit court reasoned that
since petitioner's personal liability on the promissory notes which
secured the mortgage had been discharged, there was no further
claim which the debtor could reschedule under a Chapter 13.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a debtor
could include a mortgage lien in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy reor-
ganization plan "once the personal obligation secured by the mort-
gaged property has been discharged in a Chapter 7 proceeding."5 4
The Court noted that the creditor's right to foreclose the mort-
gage passed through the bankruptcy estate and survived the dis-
charge., Accordingly, the Court held that the lien could be
49. Id. The bank argued to the district court that the bankruptcy court erred in
finding that "the plan lack[ed] feasibility, was not proposed in good faith, and improperly
schedule[d] a debt previously discharged in a debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding."
In re Johnson, 96 B.R. 326, 326 (D. Kan. 1989). The district court did not address these
arguments because it was not necessary for the disposition of the case. Id. at 330. Like the
district court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not need to reach the issues of good
faith and feasibility, as it disposed of the case without addressing those issues. Johnson, 111
S. Ct. at 2153. The United States Supreme Court unanimously concluded that it would not
address other issues raised on appeal (such as the good faith filing provisions or the
feasibility test to be established in a Chapter 13 confirmation), and remanded to the district
court to address those issues. Id. at 2156. Therefore, if a debtor files for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 and subsequently files under Chapter 13, the debtor arguably could address
issues of bad faith filing or issues of feasibility because the Court did not address those issues.
The same analysis applies equally if the debtor files under Chapter 7 and subsequently files
under Chapter 12.
50. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2152.
51. Id. The bank's principal argument was that the claim could not be rescheduled in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy once discharged in a previous Chapter 7. Id. (citing Johnson, 96
B.R. at 328). The district court had noted that a majority of courts considering the issue
have not allowed a debtor to reschedule a debt in a Chapter 13 plan if the debt had been
previously discharged in a Chapter 7 proceeding. Johnson, 96 B.R. at 329 (citing In re
McKinstry, 56 B.R. 191, 193 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986) and In re Binford, 53 B.R. 307, 309 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1985)). The district court noted that the primary rationale for rejecting the
debtor's position was that "the mortgagee no longer holds a 'claim' against the debtor, but
rather, holds a lien against the debtor's real estate. Thus, the mortgagee is not a 'creditor' of
the debtor and holds no claim which can be scheduled in the debtor's Chapter 13 plan." Id.
at 329-30.
52. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2152.
53. id. at 2152-53.
54. Id. at 2152.
55. Id. at 2153.
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reorganized. 56
The Court noted that, in light of the Chapter 7 discharge, the
issue was really whether or not a claim existed that could be sub-
ject to the Chapter 13 reorganization. The Court indicated that
the issue was plainly answered by reference to the construction of
the statute, its history and purpose.58 The Court then analyzed
the definition of "claim" found at § 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.
In doing so, it explained that it had adopted a broad interpretation
of the definition of the term "claim." 59 The Court added that "we
have no trouble concluding that a mortgage interest that survives
the discharge of a debtor's personal liability is a 'claim' within the
terms of § 101(5)."6" The Court stated that "[t]he conclusion that a
surviving mortgage interest is a 'claim' under § 101(5) is consistent
with other parts of the Code."'6 1 The bank argued that to treat the
claim in this fashion would circumvent the purposes of Chapter
13.62 The bank stated that to allow such an interpretation of
"claim" would encourage serial filings, which would be an abuse of
56. Id. at 2156.
57. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2153. The Court stated that a mortgage was an interest in
real property which secured the creditor's right to repayment, but it was not the sole
remedy available to the creditor. Id. The creditor may instead choose to sue on the note
itself and collect payment from the debtor's remaining personal assets to satisfy the debt.
Id. Under North Dakota law, the creditor is limited solely to the foreclosure action of the
real estate mortgage. If the creditor desires to obtain a deficiency judgment, the creditor
must determine through a jury trial the fair value of the real estate. See Brunsoman v.
Scarlett, 465 N.W.2d 162, 164 (N.D. 1991); First Interstate Bank v. Larson, 475 N.W.2d 538,
542 (N.D. 1991); H & F Hogs v. Huwe, 368 N.W.2d 553, 556 (N.D. 1985); Mischel v. Austin,
374 N.W.2d 599, 600 (N.D. 1985).
58. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2153.
59. Id. at 2154.
60. Id.
61. Id. The interpretation of similar terms throughout the Code would be consistent
with Justice Scalia's stinging attack in Dewsnup v. Timm, in which he concluded that the
Court seems to be taking a "willy nilly" approach to the application of the use of similar
language throughout the Code. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 780 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
As an example, the Supreme Court in Johnson noted that § 502(bX 1) provides that the
bankruptcy court is to determine the amount of a claim which is in dispute except to the
extent that it is unenforceable against the debtor or against the property of the debtor. The
Court noted that "[iun other words, the court must allow the claim if it is enforceable
against either the debtor or his property." Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2155 (emphasis in original).
As a further example, the Court stated that § 102(2) establishes, as a rule of construction,
that the phrase "claim against the debtor" also includes claims against property of the
debtor. Id. The Court found that the legislative history and the history of the Code
supported a liberal construction of the definition of "claim." The Court cited to the pre-
Bankruptcy Act in which the Act defined a claim to mean "all claims of whatever character
against a debtor, or its property." Id. (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that the
legislative history of § 102(2) and the committee reports accompanying § 102(2) explain that
this rule of construction contemplates, among other things, "'non-recourse loan
agreements where the creditor's only rights are against property of the debtor, and not
against the debtor personally."' Id. at 2155 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 315 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6272).
62. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2156.
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the bankruptcy court. system. The Court vehemently disagreed,
stating that Congress had "expressly prohibited various forms of
serial filings." 63 The Court noted various prohibitions of serial fil-
ings in other sections of the Code. However, the Court stated:
The absence of a like prohibition on serial filings of Chap-
ter 7 and Chapter 13 petitions, combined with the evi-
dent care with which Congress fashioned these express
prohibitions, convinces us that Congress did not intend
categorically to foreclose the benefit of Chapter 13 reor-
ganization to a debtor who had previously filed for Chap-
ter 7 relief.64
Under Johnson, the Supreme Court has opened the door to
debtors who would not originally qualify under Chapter 13 by
allowing them to fie a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which would dis-
charge the unsecured obligations. Debtors may therefore qualify
for the Chapter 13 debt limit and restructure their indebtedness
using the Chapter 13 provisions. However, this analysis is not lim-
ited exclusively to Chapter 13 bankruptcies. As a result of John-
son, it is now possible that if the debtor's debts exceed the Chapter
12 $1.5 million cap on indebtedness, the debtor could also file a
Chapter 7, discharge the unsecured indebtedness to get the debt
below the $1.5 million cap, and thereby qualify for a Chapter 12
bankruptcy.
C. ERISA PLANS ARE NOT PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE;
THEREFORE, THEY Do NOT AFFECT EXEMPTION
CLAIMS
In Patterson v. Shumate,65 a case of seminal importance to
retirement plan providers and debtors, the United States Supreme
Court held that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)-qualified plans were not property of the bankruptcy
estate.66  Patterson involved an interpretation of 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(c)(2), the provision concerning property of the estate. Spe-
cifically, the Court was concerned with property that was
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
66. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 (1992). See 11 U.S.C. § 541(aXl) (1988).
Property of the estate is defined to include "all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(aXl). The legislative
history demonstrates that the scope of this provision was to be broadly construed. United
States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1983); see also In re Swanson, 873 F.2d
1121, 1123 (8th Cir. 1989).
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excluded from the estate under "applicable nonbankruptcy
law."'67 The Court was confronted with an ERISA-qualified pen-
sion plan which, under the ERISA statutes, had restrictions on its
transferability.68 Prior to the Court's consideration of the issue,
ERISA plans had spurred a substantial amount of litigation con-
cerning whether they were exempt property of the estate.6 9
The debtor in Patterson was employed with the Coleman Fur-
niture Company for thirty years, ultimately becoming president
and chairman of the board of directors. He filed a petition under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.7" Subsequently, his case was
converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and a trustee was appointed.
The bankruptcy proceeding was consolidated with a district court
action that was pending at the time.7 ' The district court rejected
the debtor's contention that his retirement plan should be
excluded from the estate. The district court held that the
§ 541(cX2)'s exclusion and reference to applicable "'nonbank-
ruptcy law' " applied only to state law, not to ERISA or other fed-
eral law.7 2 In this case, if the state law of Virginia was applied to
Shumate's interest in the plan, it would not qualify as a spendthrift
trust. If it was not a spendthrift trust, then under this interpreta-
tion of 11 U.S.C § 541(cX2), the property would not be excluded
from the estate.7 3 Furthermore, the debtor argued that the prop-
erty was exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(bX2XA) as property
'exempt under Federal law.' -174 The district court rejected this
argument as well. The court of appeals reversed.75 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed the court of appeals.76
The Supreme Court found that a plain reading of § 541 of the
67. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2245.
68. Id.
69. As examples of the litigation on ERISA plans, see In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476 (4th
Cir. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan excluded from the estate); In re Harline, 950 F.2d 669
(10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2291 (1992) (ERISA-qualified plan was excludable);
In re Fritsvold, 115 B.R. 192 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (state statute was preempted by ERISA
and not excluded); In re Volpe, 100 B.R. 840 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (ERISA exempted
under state statute and preemption not applicable).
70. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2245. Coleman Furniture Company also filed a petition in
bankruptcy. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 83 B.R. 404, 406 (W.D. Va. 1988)).
73. Id. A spendthrift trust is generally defined as one in which:
(1) the trust implicitly or explicitly prohibits the voluntary and involuntary
alienation of the beneficiary's interest; (2) the beneficiary is the donee or
testamentary beneficiary and is not the settlor of the trust; (3) the beneficiary has
no present dominion or control over the trust corpus.
In re Fritsvold, 115 B.R. 192, 195 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (emphasis in original).
74. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2245.
75. Id. at 2245-46.
76. Id. at 2246.
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Bankruptcy Code suggested that property excluded from the
estate under applicable nonbankruptcy law included all law, not
just state law.7 7 The Court held that "to include federal law as
well as state law comports with other references in the Bank-
ruptcy Code to sources of law."7  Comparing several other aspects
and sections of the Code, the Court held that where Congress
wanted to restrict applicable nonbankruptcy law to state law, it
did so specifically throughout the Code.79
After determining that applicable nonbankruptcy law was not
limited to state law, the Court then looked at the anti-alienation
provisions of ERISA.8 ° The petitioner urged the Court to consider
the legislative history, which the petitioner contended would
demonstrate that ERISA plans were not intended to be excluded
from the definition of property of the estate."' The Court stated
that when a statutory ambiguity exists, it may be appropriate to
refer to legislative history. The Court opined, however, that "the
clarity of the statutory language at issue in this case obviates the
need for any such inquiry." 2 The Court noted that although
§ 522(dX1OXe) exempts such plans from property of the estate, it
does exempt more property than do the ERISA-qualified plans.8 3
The Court stated that Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) are
not ERISA-qualified plans and, therefore, are not subject to exclu-
sion from the estate and must be exempted by the debtor.8"
It is important to note that qualified plans such as Keogh
plans, Seps, Basics, or 401(k)s are excluded from the bankruptcy
estate and will not be subject to the exemption laws. On the other
hand, if a debtor has an IRA, the IRA is subject to the limitations
that the state or the federal bankruptcy law impose on what can
be exempted.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia stated that he was
amazed that three courts of appeals could even think that "'appli-
77. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988). Section 541(a) provides for broad interpretation
of what constitutes property of the estate. Id. Section 541(cX2) excludes property from the
debtor's estate if the property is subject to "a restriction on the transfer of a beneficial
interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable bankruptcy law is
enforceable in a case under this title." Id. § 541(cX2) (emphasis added). This restriction had
been interpreted to apply only to spendthrift trusts. See, e.g., In re Fritsvold 115 B.R. 192
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
78. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. 2246.
79. Id. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(cX2), 522(bX1), 523(aX5), 903(1) (1988) (examples of state
law restrictions in the Code).
80. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2247.
81. Id. at 2248.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2248-49.
84. Id. at 2249.
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cable non-bankruptcy law'" was synonymous to "'state law.' "85
Justice Scalia found that the legal culture had "so far departed
from attention to text, or is so lacking in agreed-upon methodology
for creating and interpreting text, that it any longer makes sense
to talk of 'a government of laws, not of men.' "8s6 Justice Scalia
noted that the Bankruptcy Code must be read as a whole and that
individual sections cannot be examined in isolation. 7
The Patterson decision makes it clear that debtors are not only
entitled to retain their exempt property, but if they have an
ERISA-qualified plan, they may also keep that plan from becoming
part of the estate and thereby prevent its distribution to their
creditors. The Supreme Court's interpretation, however, creates a
consistency between state court exemptions and exemptions that
are claimed under bankruptcy court jurisdiction. Debtors, how-
ever, must be careful to be certain that their plans are qualified.
After Patterson, courts will more carefully scrutinize whether, in
fact, those plans are technically qualified plans. It is important to
remember, however, that the Supreme Court found that IRAs are
not covered by ERISA statutes and, therefore, IRAs are property
of the estate. As such, they may be available for an eventual distri-
bution to creditors, if they are not exempt.
D. OBJECTIONS TO EXEMPTIONS MUST BE TIMELY, EVEN
THOUGH THERE IS No BASIS FOR THE
EXEMPTIONS
In Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 8 the Supreme Court
addressed an untimely objection to the debtor's exemptions by the
Chapter 7 trustee. 9 The debtor in Taylor filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy while she was pursuing an employment discrimination
claim in state court. The discrimination proceedings began in
1978 when the debtor filed a complaint with the Pittsburgh Com-
mission on Human Relations. She had alleged that her employer,
Trans World Airlines (TWA), had denied her promotions on the
basis of her race and sex.9° The debtor followed the Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations administrative process, and then
85. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2250 (Scalia, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 2250-51.
87. Id. at 2251. Justice Scalia pointed out, however, that the Court, in the same term as
in the case of Dewsnup v. Timm, had in fact taken that very approach to the analysis. Id.
See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
88. 112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992).
89. Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644, 1646 (1992).
90. Id.
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appealed to the Pennsylvania state court system. In October 1984,
while the matter was pending in state court, the debtor filed a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The petitioner, Robert J. Taylor, was
appointed as trustee. The law firm of Freeland & Kronz repre-
sented the debtor in the discrimination lawsuit.9 1
On the exemption schedule filed with the court, the debtor
claimed the money that she expected to win in the lawsuit was
exempt property.9 2 This property was described in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings as "proceeds from a lawsuit-[Davis] v. TWA"
and as a "[c]laim for lost wages" with its value listed as
"unknown. 903 At the first meeting of creditors, the attorneys for
the debtor told the trustee that the claim might be worth $90,000.
Several days after the first meeting, the trustee wrote to the attor-
neys representing the debtor, telling them that he considered the
claim to be property of the bankruptcy estate and asking the attor-
neys for more details about the suit. The debtor's attorneys
responded, indicating with even more optimism, that the lawsuit
might be worth as much as $110,000.1 4 Taylor, the trustee, did not
object at that time to the exemption and, as noted by the Court,
the record indicated that even the trustee believed the lawsuit
had no value.95
Subsequently, the law suit was settled whereby TWA paid
Davis the sum of $110,000. A total of $71,000 was paid jointly to
Davis and the attorneys Freeland & Kronz. Apparently, Davis had
signed over this check for payment of attorney fees.96 The
remainder of the settlement was paid in other means. 7 Upon
learning of the settlement, the trustee commenced an action
against Freeland & Kronz in bankruptcy court, requesting the law
firm to relinquish the money to the estate because it was nonex-
empt property. 98
The bankruptcy court agreed with the trustee and concluded
that there was "no statutory basis" for claiming the proceeds of the
lawsuit as exempt. Consequently, the court ordered that approxi-
mately $23,000 be returned to Taylor. This sum would have been
sufficient to pay all of Taylor's creditors in full.99 The district court
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1646-47.
95. Id. at 1647.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1647.
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affirmed, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the objection was not timely and therefore, all proceeds were
exempt. 00
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.' 0 '
Again, applying a plain meaning interpretation of the Code, the
Court held that both the exemption statutes and the procedural
statutes for objecting to exemptions are to be plainly read.10 2 The
Court noted that § 522(b) allowed the debtor to choose either state
or federal exemptions and that § 522(l) set forth the procedure for
claiming such exemptions. All a debtor needs to do is file a list of
property claimed as exempt. The Court also noted that unless a
party in interest objects in a timely fashion to the property
claimed as exempt, the property becomes exempt.'03 The Court
held that although § 522(l) does not specify the time for objecting
to the claimed exemptions, Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b) does.' 0 4 The
Court noted that the debtor properly followed the rules and
exempted the property, and the trustee did not object. The Court
further stated that the parties agreed that the amount of the
exemption to which Davis would have been authorized under
either state or federal law would not have encompassed all of the
property that she in fact received. The Court postulated that
"Taylor... apparently could have made a valid objection under
§ 522(l) and Rule 4003 if he had acted promptly. We hold, how-
ever, that his failure to do so prevents him from challenging the
validity of the exemption now."'105
The trustee argued that exemptions must be filed in good faith
and that the failure to do so was a basis for allowing the trustee to
object in an untimely fashion. The Court flatly rejected this argu-
ment.10 6 The Court noted that if Taylor did not know the value of
the potential proceeds of the lawsuit, he could have sought a valu-
ation hearing under Bankruptcy Rule 4003(c) in order to assign a
value to the proceeds; or in the alternative, he could have simply
asked the bankruptcy court for an extension in order to object to
100. Id.
101. See id. Justice Thomas wrote for the majority of the Court.
102. Id. at 1648. This case is another block in the strict constructionist foundation
being cemented by the Court.
103. Id. Once the property is exempt, it is no longer property of the estate within the
meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541. See, e.g.,-In re Sherk, 918 F.2d 1170, 1174 (5th Cir. 1990).
104. Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1648. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b). Bankruptcy Rule
4003(b) provides that unless a trustee or a creditor objects within 30 days after the
conclusion of the first meeting of creditors or the amendment of the exemption schedule,
the property is deemed exempt. Id.
105. Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1647-48.
106. Id. at 1648.
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the exemption.1 0 7 Therefore, the Court found that there was a
remedy available to the trustee. 0 8
The trustee further argued that to allow the debtor to claim as
exempt any property that the debtor clearly knew was not
exempt, would lead to what the Eighth Circuit called " 'exemption
by declaration.' "109 The Court found that there were a number of
means to ensure that debtors and their attorneys do not exercise
improper conduct as postulated by the trustee." 0 Such means
include a denial of discharge for fraudulent claims under
§ 727(aX4XB), Rule 9011 sanctions, and criminal sanctions under
18 U.S.C. § 152. The Court noted that "[w]e have no authority to
limit the application of § 522(l) to exemptions claimed in good
faith."111
Justice Stevens, in dissent, noted that the Court should have
considered the equitable doctrine of tolling in order to suspend
the thirty-day limitation for objecting to exemptions. 112 He also
noted that it was a wide-spread practice of bankruptcy law to con-
sider strong equitable considerations and that, in this case, equity
would justify the trustee's position in the matter." 3 Justice Ste-
vens concluded that courts have avoided the harsh result of fed-
eral statutes by relying on either fraudulent concealment or
undiscovered fraud in order to toll the period of limitation." 14 Jus-
tice Stevens was concerned about what the Eighth Circuit and
other bankruptcy courts had raised as exemption by fiat or by dec-
laration. He stated:
The equitable principles that motivated these bank-
ruptcy courts are best encapsulated by the court in In re
Bennett. There, the court explained that to apply Rule
4003(b) rigidly would be to encourage a debtor to claim
that all of her property was exempt, thus leaving it to the
trustee and creditors to sift through the myriad claimed
exemptions to assess their validity. Such a policy would
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. See also In re Peterson, 920 F.2d 1389, 1393 (8th Cir. 1990).
110. Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1648. Such "improper conduct," for example, could be
claiming as exempt property that is clearly not exempt. Id.
111. Id. Taylor made an additional argument in his Supreme Court brief that he had
not addressed in his request for certiorari: He argued that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), the general
equity provisions of the Code, allowed the Court to consider the provision of good faith.
However, the Court said that it would not consider the argument because it was not
addressed in the petition for certiorari. Id. at 1649.
112. Id. at 1649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1651.
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result in reversion to "the law of the streets, with bare
possession constituting not nine, but ten, parts of the law;
orderly administration of estates would be replaced by
uncertainty and constant litigation if not outright
anarchy."1 15
Justice Stevens concluded: "In my view, it is a mistake to adopt a
'strict letter' approach ... when justice requires a more searching
inquiry."116
Thus, if a creditor or the trustee objects to the debtor's exemp-
tions, the objection must be made within thirty days after the first
date set for the first meeting of creditors, or thirty days after the
exemption claim or amendment is served. If the trustee is con-
cerned about the value of the property or concerned that the
property may be of inconsequential value, the trustee still must
object to the exemption, or seek either a valuation from the court
or an extension of time to object to the exemption. However, such
action must be taken within the thirty-day period, or the failure to
act in a timely fashion will be fatal to the objecting party.
E. JUDGMENTS GRANTED IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
WHICH DIVIDE EXISTING PROPERTY OF THE
PARTIES MAY NOT BE AVOIDED UNDER 11
U.S.C. § 522
1. Property transferred in divorce which was owned by
the parties jointly during the marriage may not
be avoided under 11 US.C. f 522.
In Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 1 7 the Supreme Court was confronted
with a lien avoidance issue under 11 U.S.C § 522(f) involving the
debtor's attempt to avoid the judgment lien of his ex-spouse which
transferred jointly owned property."l 8 Prior to filing a Chapter 7
bankruptcy, the debtor-respondent, Gerald Sanderfoot, had
received a divorce decree from the petitioner, Jeanne Farrey.
Farrey and Sanderfoot were married for approximately
twenty years and resided in Wisconsin throughout the marriage.
At the time of the divorce decree, they owned an interest in Wis-
consin real estate, which was the family home. The decree
awarded the family home to Sanderfoot and a payment of
115. Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1651 (citing In re Bennett, 36 B.R. 893, 895 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1984)) (footnote omitted).
116. Id. at 1652 (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall 342, 347 (1875)).
117. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
118. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1827 (1991).
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$29,208.44 to Farrey. The divorce court ordered the payment to
be secured by a lien against the real estate. In exchange for the
lien, Farrey was to convey her interest in the real estate to
Sanderfoot. 1 9
After Sanderfoot filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, he com-
menced an action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f X1) to avoid Far-
rey's lien.120 Farrey objected to the motion to avoid her lien,
arguing that § 522(f X1) could not divest her of her interest in the
real estate. 121 The bankruptcy court held for Farrey. The district
court reversed, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the circuit court.
The Supreme Court noted that under § 522(f X1), a debtor
may avoid a lien on an interest a debtor has in property to the
extent that such a lien impairs the'debtor's exemption if such lien
is a judicial lien. The Court found, however, that § 522(f X1) cre-
ated a number of conditions in order to avoid the lien. 122 First, the
lien has to be a judicial lien; second, it must impair an exemption
available to the debtor; and third, it must be a lien on an interest of
the debtor in property of the estate. 123 In the instant case, the lien
was created by a judgment of divorce and was encumbering the
debtor's homestead. Therefore, the lien impaired the homestead
exemption under state law.'2 4 However, the third element must
also be met in order to avoid the lien.
The Court stated that the debtor may only avoid the "'fixing
of a lien on an interest of the debtor in . . . property.' ",125 The
Court found that this phrase required that the lien could not
attach to the property prior to the debtor's interest in the prop-
erty. In other words, if the lien was against the property when the
debtor received it from a third party, the lien was not avoidable.
119. Id.
120. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(fX1) (1988). Section 522(fX1) provides as follows:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the
fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such
lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under
subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is-
(1) a judicial lien ....
Id.
121. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1828.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988)). The Court held that Farrey's Lien did not
attach to the pre-existing interest of the husband because the divorce decree which
conveyed the entire property to the debtor, also created the judgment lien. Id. Therefore,
the debtor had no interest in the ex-spouse's property at the time of the lien. Id.
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Conversely, if the lien arose after the debtor owned an interest in
the property, it was avoidable. The Court held that since the lien
was simultaneously transferred within the division and convey-
ance of the property in the divorce judgment, that the debtor did
not own a fee simple interest prior to the attachment of the
lien. 2 6 In the words of the Court: "Since Sanderfoot never pos-
sessed his new fee simple interest before the lien 'fixed,' § 522(f X 1)
is not available to void the lien.' 27 Therefore, the debtor could
not avoid the judicial lien in this case.121
Farrey instructs that in order for a debtor to avoid a judicial
lien under § 522(f), the debtor must have a fee simple interest in
the property prior to the fixing of the lien. Therefore, in a divorce
situation in which the property is jointly owned by the parties, and
the divorce decree separates and conveys the property to one of
the spouses, and a judgment lien is ordered for the benefit of the
other spouse, the debtor could not avoid the judicial lien and claim
the property exempt in a subsequent bankruptcy filing.
2. A debtor may avoid a lien of the former spouse that
impairs exemptions under § 522(f) if the
property was not acquired during the
marriage.
In Owen v. Owen,129 the Court held that a judgment lien on
property not acquired during the marriage or in a dissolution
action was avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) if it impaired an
exemption of the debtor.' 30 Owen was factually similar to Farrey
v. Sanderfoot.'3' There was, however, one distinction: The prop-
erty at issue in Owen had never been owned either jointly or indi-
vidually by the nondebtor former spouse and was not split up in
the dissolution action.
In Owen, a Florida debtor, Dwight Owen, divorced the credi-
tor, Helen Owen. 132 In 1975, Helen Owen had obtained a judg-
ment against her former husband for approximately $160,000.113
The judgment was docketed in Sarasota County, Florida. How-
ever, at the time the judgment was docketed, the debtor did not
126. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1830-31.
127. Id. at 1831.
128. Id. at 1830.
129. 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991).
130. Owen v. Owen, 111 S. Ct. 1833, 1835-36 (1991).
131. Id. at 1834-35. See Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 127-28.
132. Owen, 111 S. Ct. at 1834-35. It is worth noting that Owen was decided on the
same day as Farrey.
133. Id. at 1834.
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own any property in Sarasota County.1 34 Subsequently, the debtor
purchased a condominium in Sarasota County. Upon the acquisi-
tion of the title, the property, which did not qualify as a homestead
at that time, became subject to his former spouse's judgment
lien.135 One year later, Florida amended its homestead law so that
the debtor's condominium property thereafter qualified as a
homestead under state law.136
In January of 1986, Mr. Owen filed for relief under Chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code and claimed the condominium was his
homestead and therefore exempt. The bankruptcy court allowed
his exemption in the homestead, but did not allow him to avoid
the lien of the former spouse pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f X1).
The district court affirmed, holding that the property did not qual-
ify for an exemption because the lien attached prior to the time
the exemption was allowed. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed on similar grounds. 3 7 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed.
The Supreme Court noted that the estate consisted of all
interests in property, legal and equitable, and that an exemption
was an interest that was drawn from the estate for the benefit of
the debtor. The Court noted that § 522(b) set forth the property
that a debtor may exempt. A debtor may choose either federal or
state exemptions unless the state "opts" to limit the exemptions to
only those allowed under state law. Florida was such an "opt out"
state; it permitted the debtor to choose only state exemptions. 38
The Court was concerned solely with the issue of whether the
debtor could avoid a lien which impaired an exemption to which
the debtor would have been entitled under § 522(b) had the state
permitted the debtor to use the federal exemptions. 39 The Court
held that if it did not allow the lien avoidance, it would be revers-
ing widely accepted and uniform positions taken by federal bank-
ruptcy courts regarding federal exemptions. 4 °  The Court
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1834-35.
136. Id. at 1835.
137. Owen, 111 S. Ct. at 1835.
138. Id. at 1835-36. States may "opt out" of the federal exemptions. 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(bXl) (1988). Therefore, the federal exemptions do not apply and the debtor is limited
to the state exemptions. 3 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 522.01, at 522-11 to 522-12
n.4a (1992).
139. Owen, 111 S. Ct. at 1836.
140. Id. The creditor in Owen had argued that to allow the lien to be avoided under§ 522(f) "would not preserve the exemption but would expand it." Id. The Supreme Court
held that this position has been "widely and uniformly rejected with respect to built-in
limitations on the federal exemptions." Id. (emphasis in original). To take the creditor's
argument to its logical conclusion would basically render § 522(f) meaningless, because no
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reasoned that to read § 522(f) in such a manner would not allow
any debtor to avoid any lien even with the federal exemptions.
The sole question addressed by the Owen court was whether the
lien impaired an exemption to which the debtor would have been
entitled but for the lien itself. The Court said that the debtor
would have been entitled to the exemption but for that lien and,
therefore, the debtor could avoid the fixing of the lien. If the
Court refused to allow the judgment to be avoided, then § 522(f)
would in essence be a nullity-as no debtor could ever avoid a
judgment lien, because a judgment always arises before the bank-
ruptcy filing.
The Owen decision must, however, be read in conjunction
with Farrey v. Sanderfoot14 1 because the Owen Court did not
address whether the lien fixed on "an interest of the debtor. 1
42
Therefore, if the divorce judgment attaches to property acquired
by the debtor which was either nonmarital property or was
acquired by the debtor after the dissolution of the marriage, then
the judgment lien of the former spouse may be avoided under
§ 522(f) as long as the property is subject to exemption by the
debtor.
F. A DEBTOR IN A CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY MAY NOT
"STRIP DOWN" A CREDITOR'S CLAIM AGAINST
REAL PROPERTY EVEN THOUGH THE DEBT
EXCEEDS THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
In Dewsnup v. Timm, 43 the Supreme Court refused to allow
the debtor to redeem property by "stripping down" the creditor's
lien. The Chapter 7 debtor commenced an adversary proceeding
in order to determine the validity and extent of the note and deed
liens could be avoided if they encumbered any exemption. Id. The Supreme Court noted
that this position has been uniformly rejected by the federal courts as applied to federal
exemptions. The Supreme Court gave, as an example, the federal homestead exemption.
Id. The Supreme Court stated:
[I]f respondents' interpretations of section 522(f) were applied to this
exemption, a debtor who owned a house worth $10,000 that was subject to a
judicial lien of $9,000 would not be entitled to the full homestead exemption of
$7,500. The judicial lien would not be avoidable under § 522(f), since it does not
"impair" the exemption, which is limited to the debtor's "aggregate interest" of
$1,000.
Id.
141. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
142. Owen, 111 S. Ct. at 1838. The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to
address the issue of whether the lien fixed on the interest of the debtor and also the issue of
whether the Florida statute extending the homestead exemption was an impermissible
"taking" under the Constitution. Id. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70
(1982).
143. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
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of trust held on the debtor's real estate. The debtor complained
that the creditor's debt was far in excess of the fair market value of
the real estate. The debtor requested that the fair value of the real
estate debt be set and the claim be revalued pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(d) in order to allow the debtor to redeem the property at its
fair market value. 44
The United States Bankruptcy Court held that the debtors
could not redeem the real estate, which had been abandoned to
them by the trustee, by paying the secured creditor the fair mar-
ket value of the property. The district court affirmed, as did the
court of appeals.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the United States Supreme
Court, held that the debtors could not "strip down" the creditor's
lien on real property to the judicially determined value of the col-
lateral. 145 The debtor took the position that § 506(a) and § 506(d)
were complimentary and should to be read together. Section
506(a) provides that a claim is secured only to the extent of the
judicially determined value of the real estate on which the lien is
fixed. The Court noted that § 506(a) bifurcates the classes of
claims allowed under § 502 into secured claims and unsecured
claims.146 The debtor can avoid the lien on the property pursuant
to § 506(d) to the extent the lien is no longer secured and, thus, not
an allowed secured claim. The Court was persuaded by the
debtor's argument that § 506(a) and § 506(d) should be read in
conjunction. However, the Court indicated that it was not writing
on a "clean slate" and that, if it was, it
might be inclined to agree with the [debtor] that the
words "allowed secured claim" must take the same mean-
ing in section 506(d) as in section 506(a). But, given the
ambiguity in the text, we are not convinced that Congress
intended to depart from the pre-Code rule that liens pass
through bankruptcy unaffected. 47
The Court espoused that if it were to allow the debtor to strip
down the lien to the secured value as of the date of the filing of the
bankruptcy, the debtor may gain a windfall if the property value
increased between the time of the bankruptcy strip down and the
foreclosure sale. 148 The Court concluded that the creditor's lien
144. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 776 (1992).
145. Id. at 778.
146. Id. at 777.
147. Id. at 778.
148. Id.
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stays with the property until the foreclosure.
In some very curious language, which may potentially be
applicable to 11 U.S.C. § 1225(aX4) and 11 U.S.C. § 1325(aX4) deal-
ing with the valuation of an interest, the Court held that "[a]ny
increase over the judicially determined valuation during bank-
ruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit of the creditor, not to the ben-
efit of the debtor and not to the benefit of other unsecured
creditors whose claims have been allowed and who had nothing to
do with the mortgagor-mortgagee bargain.' 49 The Court contin-
ued by noting that the lienholder should not be subject to such
action simply because it subjected itself to the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings by filing its proof of claim. The Court stated that the
lienholder would not have been subject to the strip down of its lien
if it would have "stayed aloof from the bankruptcy proceed-
ings." '50 The creditor would be able, under state law, to foreclose
its interest and sell the property for whatever value it could obtain
at the sale. There would be no strip down in the sale and the cred-
itor would be entitled to the full value of its lien.
Furthermore, the Court did not address the issue raised by
debtor's amicus: The "plain language of § 506(d) dictates that the
proper portion of an undersecured lien on property in a Chapter 7
case is void."1 5 ' The amicus asserted that to hold otherwise would
eliminate "an undersecured creditor's ability to participate in the
distribution of the estate's assets.' '1 52
Finally, the Court concluded by indicating that its decision
was congruent with both the Bankruptcy Act and the Court's
recent acknowledgment under Farrey v. Sanderfoot'53 and John-
son v. Home State Bank154 that "a lien on real property passes
149. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778. Do the Court's statements mean that if the debtor
has expended unsecured assets or labor between the time of filing and confirmation on
secured assets, that the benefit goes to the secured creditor? If so, then what if the property
is a depreciable asset that loses value in this time period? Does this loss fall to the creditor?
Should the debtor immediately upon filing bring a motion to value the assets? All these
questions are left for future determination by the Court. Compare In re Lupfer Bros., 120
B.R. 1002 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990); In re Musil, 99 B.R. 448 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988); In re
Bluridg Farms, Inc., 93 B.R. 648 (S.D. Iowa 1988); In re Perdue, 95 B.R. 475 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1988) with In re Nielsen, 86 B.R. 177 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988).
150. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778. This is an interesting statement in that the recent
cases dealing with jury trials indicate that if an entity stays aloof from the bankruptcy
proceedings, that entity has the right to a jury trial; however, an entity that does not stay
aloof from the bankruptcy proceedings is subject to different treatment in that there it has
no right to a jury trial. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
151. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 777.
152. Id.
153. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
154. 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
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through the bankruptcy [estate] unaffected.' 1 55 This statement is
even more interesting because it seemingly implies that the bank-
ruptcy court cannot strip down any liens against property if the
liens are going to pass through the estate unaffected.' 56
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Souter in a stinging dissent,
held to his theory of a "plain reading" or strict construction of the
statute. 5 7 Justice Scalia pointed out that "allowed secured claim"
was not an ambiguous phrase. 58 Moreover, the terminology
"allowed secured claim" was specifically set forth in § 506, as well
as throughout the Code; therefore, its application and use should
be consistent across the statutory provisions. 15 9
Justice Scalia quite correctly pointed out that § 1225(aX4) and
§ 1325(aX4) deal with "allowed secured claims" and the treatment
of those claims under reorganization plans. The dissent noted that
when Congress wanted to refer to the complete claim of the credi-
tors, as opposed to the secured and allowed unsecured claims of
the creditors, that it referred to the combined claim as being the
"allowed claim.' 6° Justice Scalia wrote that "[g]iven this clear
and unmistakable pattern of usage, it seems to me impossible to
hold, as the Court does, that the words 'allowed secured claim' in
§ 506(d) need not be read as an indivisible term of art defined by
reference to § 506(a).' "161 Justice Scalia criticized the Court for
not following the traditional rules of statutory construction in fol-
lowing the meaning of the language of the text in the same section
and throughout the Code. 162 Justice Scalia also criticized the
Court for not following the "plain meaning" of the statute and for
making decisions which rest "upon policy intuitions of a legislative
character."'1 63
As a result of the Dewsnup decision, a debtor may not use
Chapter 7 to "strip down" liens against property which are in
excess of the fair market value of the property. Dewsnup, how-
ever, is one case in which the Supreme Court's use of the "plain
meaning" of the statute becomes a bit clouded. Justice Scalia, in
his dissenting opinion, reminds the Court that it has lost sight of
155. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778.
156. Does that mean that the Court can not strip down liens in reorganization cases?
Clearly not. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(aX5), 1325(aX5) (1988).
157. See Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 780 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Id. The dissent noted 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) as an example which refers to an allowed
claim. Id.
161. Id. (citations omitted).
162. Id. at 781.
163. Id.
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the pea under the shell. Moreover, although it is a dissent, Justice
Scalia's opinion surely sets the tone of the Court for a strict con-
structionist attitude in bankruptcy matters and presumably will be
the basis for many more decisions in this area. At a minimum, it is
consistent with Scalia's other recent opinions dealing with bank-
ruptcy issues in which he has written for the majority of the Court.
G. THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS DEFENSE AND
THE TIMING OF A TRANSFER ARE Now MORE
CLEARLY DEFINED BY THE COURT
1. The Court held that there is no difference between
long-term and short-term debt under the
ordinary course of business defense in
preference actions
In Union Bank v. Wolas,114 the Supreme Court addressed
whether there was a distinction between short-term and long-
term debt for purposes of the ordinary course of business defense
to a preference action.' 6 5 The Court held that the creditor, obli-
gated with either short-term or long-term debt, could raise the
defense of ordinary course of business payments within the mean-
ing of 11 U.S.C. § 547(cX2).
The creditor in Wolas loaned the debtor seven million dollars.
The debtor made two interest payments on the indebtedness,
which amounted to approximately $100,000 within ninety days
prior to the filing of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.' 6 The
Chapter 7 trustee commenced an action against the bank, alleging
that the payments were avoidable preferences. The bankruptcy
court held in favor of the bank, finding that the payments were
made in the ordinary course of business, and therefore, an excep-
164. 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991).
165. Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 533 (1991). See 11 U.S.C. § 547(cX2) (1988).
Section 547(cX2) provides in pertinent part:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferree; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms ....
Id. The definitional sections in the Bankruptcy Code do not distinguish between short-term
or long-term indebtedness. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 530, n.7. The Ninth Circuit rejected the
bank's argument that the revolving line of credit involved in this transaction was not long-
term debt because it was for less than one year. Id. at 529 n.5.
166. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 529.
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tion to the preference rule.'6 7 The district court affirmed in favor
of the bank, but subsequently decided a parallel case and reversed
the prior decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.168
Using a strict constructionist analysis, the Court held that
§ 547(cX2) did not specifically distinguish between short-term and
long-term indebtedness. The Court rejected the trustee's argu-
ment that both the Bankruptcy Act and the legislative history indi-
cated that the defense of ordinary course of business 69 was only
available to trade creditors or short-term creditors.' 70 The Court
said that the statutory language of § 547 did not specifically refer
to either short-term or long-term debt;' 7 ' consequently, any credi-
tor is entitled to use the ordinary Course of business defense. The
Court, therefore, reversed the case without commenting on
whether the ordinary course of business exception would have any
merit as applied to the facts. However, the Court did find that the
exception could be raised as a legal defense in order to preclude
summary judgment.'7 2
Therefore, any indebtedness, whether for a short-term basis
or a long-term basis, is still subject to the ordinary course of busi-
ness defense as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 547(cX2). If the transfer is
incurred in the ordinary course of business, the creditor has a
defense to the preference action irrespective of how long the loan
is in place.
167. Id. The purpose behind the preference statute is to undo certain pre-binkruptcy
transactions, the effect of which is to frustrate the distribution scheme set forth in the
Bankruptcy Code. The second policy is to permit the trustee to avoid pre-bankruptcy
transactions which occur within a short period before bankruptcy. This discourages
creditors from racing to the courthouse to dismember debtors during their slides into
bankruptcy. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 177, 178 (1978).
168. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 529.
169. Id. at 531. Prior to the amendments of the Code in 1984, § 547(cX2) provided that
the transfer which was subject to the avoidance action had to be "made not later than forty-
five days after such debt was incurred." Id. at 530 n.8. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(cX2XB) (1982).
At the same time, the 1984 amendment also added § 547(cX7). In effect, the prior version
of § 547(cX2) excluded from avoidance many ordinary course of business payments, but the
forty-five day provision of subparagraph (B) caused some difficulty. It failed to take into
consideration short-term financing that calls for payment beyond the forty-five days. The
courts had a difficult time deciding, when the forty-five day period started and when the
debt was really incurred. Because Congress dropped this provision, it was argued by the
respondents in Wolas that Congress had no intention of extending the defense to long-term
lenders. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 531.
170. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 530-31.
171. Id. at 530.
172. See id. at 533-34. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, was very critical of the
legal culture and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals because it gave merit to the argument
that the ordinary course of business defense was available only to short-term debt. He
reasoned that the statute was completely devoid of any language concerning short-term or
long-term debt. Id. at 534. Justice Scalia's concurrence is consistent with his writings which
advocate a strict constructionist approach of the Court.
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2. A "transfer" involving a check -occurs for purposes
of § 547 when the check is "honored" by the
bank.
The Supreme Court in Barnhill v. Johnson 7 3 decided the
issue of when a "transfer" takes place for purposes of § 547, when
the payment is made by a check. 17 4 Barnhill involved the inter-
pretation of the preference provision of the Bankruptcy Code
found at 11 U.S.C. § 547. In this case, the debtor made a payment
on a good faith debt to Barnhill. The check was delivered to Barn-
hill on November 18th, but was postdated to November 19th, and
was honored by the drawee bank on November 20th. The debtor
subsequently filed a Chapter 11 petition. The parties agreed that
November 20th was the ninetieth day prior to the bankruptcy
filing. 175
Johnson, the bankruptcy trustee, commenced an adversary
action against Barnhill, requesting him to return the proceeds as a
preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). 176 Johnson contended that
the transfer occurred on November 20th, the date the check was
honored by the bank ("honor rule"). Consequently, Johnson con-
tended that the transfer occurred within the ninety-day prefer-
ence period.' 77 Barnhill claimed that the transfer occurred on
November 18th, the date the check was delivered ("delivery
rule"). As such, Barnhill asserted that the transfer occurred
outside the ninety-day preference period.17 8
The bankruptcy court concluded that the "delivery rule" gov-
erned and, therefore, held that the transfer took place outside the
ninety-day period. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court determined
that there was no preferential transfer, and the court denied
recovery to the trustee. 79 The district court affirmed. The Tenth
Circuit reversed, concluding that the "honor rule" should govern
actions under § 547(b).'8 0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
173. 112 S. Ct. 1386 (1992).
174. Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1388 (1992).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. If the transfer took place within ninety days before the filing of the
bankruptcy and assuming that the rest of the other elements of § 547 could be met, the
trustee could recover the transfer as an avoidable preference. 11 U.S.C. § 547(bX4) (1988).
In this case, it was not established that there were any insiders and, therefore, 11 U.S.C.§ 547(bX4XB) did not apply.
178. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1388.
179. Id.
180. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). Section 547(b) provides that the trustee may
avoid a transfer of a debtor's interest in property made within ninety days before the filing
of a bankruptcy petition. Id.
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noting that there was a split among the circuits as to which date to
use when determining the occurrence of a transfer for preference
actions-the date of delivery or the date of honor. 8 ' The
Supreme Court, applying the date of "honor rule," affirmed the
decision of the Tenth Circuit. 18 2
The Court analyzed what constituted a "transfer" within the
meaning of the Code. Under § 101(54) of the Code, a "transfer" is
defined to mean every mode of disposing of property, either
directly or indirectly, absolute or conditional, voluntarily or invol-
untarily, including a retention of a security interest. 18 3 The Court
noted that 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) also aided in ascertaining the mean-
ing and dating of a "transfer.' 4 The Court held that what consti-
tuted a transfer was determined in accord with federal law unless
there was no federal law to apply. Under such circumstances,
however, the property law of the state may be used for gui-
dance.'8 ' The Court, reviewing New Mexico's statute dealing
with Uniform Commercial Code,18 6 stated that "[a] person with an
account at a bank enjoys a claim against the bank for funds in an
amount equal to the account balance."'8 " The Court noted that a
check is merely an instrument ordering the drawee bank to pay
upon demand.'8 8 The receipt of the check does not give the recip-
ient a right against the bank because the drawee bank can refuse
to honor the check, and the drawee has no recourse against the
bank.18
9
Applying the law to the facts before it, the Court found that
the recipient of the checks had no rights against the bank, noting
that several events could interfere with the delivery and present-
ment of the check. 190 For example, the debtor could have chosen
to close the account; a third party could have acquired a lien on
the account through garnishment or other proceedings; and the
bank may have mistakenly refused to honor the check.' 9 ' There-
fore, the Court found that the transfer did not take place until the
181. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1388 & n.3.
182. Id. at 1388.
183. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1388-89.
184. Id. at 1389.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1389 n.5. The Court noted that all fifty states, the District of Columbia,
Guam, and the Virgin Islands have adopted the relevant portions of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Id.
187. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1389.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1390.
191. Id.
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bank honored the check-the time when the bank had a right to
charge the debtor's account pursuant to the state's version of the
Uniform Commercial Code. 9 ' The Court stated that using the
date of honor "left the debtor in the position that it would have
occupied if it had withdrawn cash from its account and handed it
over to the [creditor].' ' 9 3
The creditor argued that the Court should review the expan-
sive definition of transfer as set forth by the Bankruptcy Code and
consider the delivery of a check as a "conditional" transfer.
Rejecting this argument, the Court noted that at the most, the
check gave the creditor a mere right to sue the debtor on the
account, which is no better than a suit on a mere promissory
note. 194
The Court refused to consider any legislative history, stating
that legislative history is relevant only when there is "statutory
ambiguity."' 9 5 The Court found no such ambiguity.
Justices Stevens and Blackmun dissented, rebuking the Court
for neither following the "plain meaning" of the statute nor
strictly construing the transfer provisions. The dissent stated:
Thus §§ 101(54) and 547 when read together, plainly
indicate that a "transfer" by check occurs on the date the
check is delivered to the transferee, provided that the
drawee bank honors the check within 10 days. If, how-
ever, the check is not honored within the 10 days, the
"transfer" occurs on the date of honor. 196
The dissent analogized perfecting the transfer to the rights of par-
ties to recover property within ten days of the bankruptcy
filing.197
The Barnhill Court held that a transfer takes place not when a
check is issued, but rather by the date the check is honored by the
drawee bank. This holding becomes important not only in the
context of a § 547 preference situation, but also in defining the
property of the estate. Debtors' checking accounts would not be
determined from the debtors' personal check register, but would
be determined based upon the bank's records as of the date of the
filing since debtors may have outstanding checks. Barnhill illus-
192. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1390.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1390-91.
195. Id. at 1391 (quoting Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991)).
196. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(cX3) (1988).
183
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
trates that an account could be levied upon before the checks are
actually delivered to the bank. For protection, a creditor who sus-
pects that a debtor may file bankruptcy should require payment in
cash, a cashier's check, money order, or certified check. In order
to identify estate property and exemptions, counsel for the debtor
should request a bank statement which indicates the amount held
for the debtor as of the date of the filing.
H. JURY TRIALS REVISITED SINCE GRANFINANCIERA S.A. v.
NORDBERG, 109 S. CT. 2782 (1989).
In Langenkamp v. Culp,198 the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether jury trials were permitted in bankruptcy court
proceedings. The debtor, Republic Trust and Savings Company, a
failed Oklahoma financial corporation, filed a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy.' 99 The successor trustee to the debtor Langenkamp filed
an action against respondents who held passbook savings certifi-
cates issued by the debtors. These respondents had received pay-
ment on their saving certificates within the ninety-day period
prior to the filing of the Chapter 11 petition.20 0 The trustee
alleged that these payments were preferences and therefore
recoverable as property of the estate. 20 1 The respondents, some of
whom had filed proofs of claims against the bankruptcy estate,
requested a jury trial.20 2
The Court, relying on Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg,20 3
held that the Court's equitable jurisdiction involved the resolution
of allowance and disallowance claims, including actions by the
trustee for preferences when the individual had filed a claim
against the estate.20 4 In circumstances in which a creditor has filed
a claim against the estate, the creditor is not entitled to a jury trial.
If the creditor does not file a proof of claim against the estate, then
the trustee can only seek recovery of a preference through a legal
action which allows the defendant to request a jury trial.205
198. 111 S. Ct. 330 (1990), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 721 (1991).
199. Langenkamp v. Culp, 111 S. Ct. 330, 330 (1990), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. (1991).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 331.
202. Id.
203. Id. (citing Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989)).
204. Langenkamp, 111 S. Ct. at 331.
205. Id. Some creditors have tried to get courts to delay the time to file claims or to
extend the time to file timely proofs of claims in order that they could get a jury trial on any
actions against them, and thereafter wait to file proper claims. Most probably courts will
reject their requests, however, the issue is unresolved.
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Therefore, the only way creditors can obtain jury trials is if they do
not file a proof of claim.
I. WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS NEEDED BEFORE
ANY MONETARY ACTION IS FILED AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES
The Supreme Court in United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.206
addressed the issue of whether the requirement of waiver of sov-
ereign immunity was necessary to maintain an action against the
federal government.2 °7 In Nordic Village, the debtor filed for pro-
tection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. During the
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, an officer of the corporation
withdrew $26,000 from the corporation's checking account and
used $20,000 of it to obtain a cashier's check payable to the Inter-
nal Revenue Service on the officer's personal tax liability.208 The
Chapter 7 trustee sought recovery of the $20,000 by filing an
action under 11 U.S.C. § 549.209 The bankruptcy court granted
judgment for the trustee against the United States and entered a
money judgment against the United States for the $20,000.210 The
district court affirmed, as did the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.211
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) did
not waive the United States' sovereign immunity for an action
seeking monetary relief 2 12
The Court, strictly construing § 106(c), held that only those
suits authorized under subsections 106(a) and (b) were permitted
206. 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992).
207. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1014 (1992). The Supreme
Court previously decided in Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492
U.S. 96 (1989), that 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) did not authorize monetary recovery against a state.
That decision, however, was a plurality decision, in which the deciding vote of the
concurrence denied amenability to suit based upon an Eleventh Amendment claim
applicable only to the states. Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 105. The majority opinion of the Court
was authored by Justice White and joined by the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy. Id. at 98. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but stated that the court of
appeals should be affirmed, barring petitioners' action against the sovereign because it
violated the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 105 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia opined:
"I reach this conclusion, however, not on the [Court's] basis that 'Congress did not abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity' of the States, but on the ground that it had no power to
do so." Id. (citation omitted). Since Hoffman applied only to the states and not to the
federal government, Hoffman had no binding effect. Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct. at 1014.
However, the Court did use the plurality decision in Hoffman to resolve the statutory
question before it in Nordic Village. Id.
208. Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct. at 1013. The tax liability was not for the corporation.
Id.
209. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 549 (1988). Section 549 prohibits post-petition, unauthorized
transfers and allows recovery for the benefit of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550. Id.
210. Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct. at 1013.
211. Id. Upon appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed by a divided panel.
212. Id.
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against the United States.21 3 As such, the statutory waiver of sov-
ereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed. Moreover, the
Court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity is not to be lib-
erally construed.21 a The Court noted that unless the United States
files a claim against the bankruptcy estate for which the trustee
could seek a permissive (subject to set-off limitations) or compul-
sory counterclaim, there was no waiver of sovereign immunity.
215
Since the United States had not filed a proof of claim,216 the
trustee could not sue the United States for monetary damages.2 1 7
The ruling seems to indicate that the waiver of sovereign
immunity requirement is going to be strictly construed, and that
no monetary action can be maintained against the United States
unless the United States has filed a claim in the case. The Court
did indicate that other types of actions (such as injunctive or
declaratory relief action) could be entertained against the United
States. However, a creative lawsuit by a trustee seeking a declara-
tion that the United States received a fraudulent and unauthorized
transfer would, most likely, be a circumvention of the holding in
Nordic Village and would probably not pass muster, given the
interpretation of the Court. The general principle that one cannot
do indirectly what one cannot do directly, would seem to apply.218
J. THE BURDEN OF PROOF STANDARD UNDER § 523 Is THE
MERE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
STANDARD, NOT THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE STANDARD
In Grogan v. Garner,21 9 the United States Supreme Court
lowered the standard for the burden of proof in nondis-
chargeability actions.22 0 In Grogan, the Court was confronted
with the burden of proof standard applied under the nondis-
chargeability provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 523. The debtor in Grogan
213. Id. at 1015.
214. Id. at 1014.
215. Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct. at 1015.
216. There was no evidence in the record indicating whether the United States filed a
claim. Thus, one may assume that, based on the Court's analysis, it did not file a claim.
217. See Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct. at 1015.
218. A trustee may not be without recourse. Judge Kroger suggests the use of the
Tucker Act or the Little Tucker Act to bring the monetary action against the United States.
He opines that the action may possibly find its way back into the Bankruptcy Act. See The
Honorable Frank W. Kroger & Dennis M. Garvis, If at First You Don't Succeed. .. An
Alternative Remedy, After Nordic Village, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 423 (Fall 1992).
219. 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991).
220. Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1991). See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988) (setting
forth exceptions to discharge).
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lost a civil action in federal court2 21 for fraud, based upon a jury
verdict finding that the debtor had defrauded a creditor.2 22 The
burden of proof in the civil action was the mere preponderance of
the evidence standard.223 Upon the filing of the Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy petition, the debtor attempted to avoid the fraud judg-
ment. The creditor argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
prevented the debtor from discharging the debt because actual
fraud had been proven and, therefore, the debt was not discharge-
able under § 523(a).2 24
The bankruptcy court found that the elements of fraud had
been proven in a civil forum and that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel prevented the discharge of the debt.225 The district
court affirmed.226
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the Bankruptcy Code was silent as to the burden of proof under
the exceptions of the § 523 discharge provision.227 The court
found that two factors support the imposition of a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard. 228 First, the court stated that the
higher standard had generally been applied in common law fraud
actions and in resolving dischargeability issues prior to enactment
of § 523(a). Therefore, Congress could not have intended by its
silence to change this settled law.229 Second, the court opined that
the fresh start policy of the Code militated in favor of a strict con-
struction of § 523 which favored the debtor.2 3 °
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.231 The Supreme Court held that
the validity of a creditor's claim is determined by state law and the
issue of nondischargeability is determined by federal law.2 32 The
Supreme Court noted that the creditor in Grogan reduced its
fraud claim to a valid final judgment in a jurisdiction that required
proof of fraud by a mere preponderance of the evidence, and then
sought to minimize additional litigation costs by invoking the doc-
221. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 656 (citing Grogan v. Garner, 806 F.2d 829, 831 (8th Cir.
1986)).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 657.
224. Id. The debt was alleged to be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XA),
because the money was obtained by actual fraud. Id.
225. Id. at 656 (citing In re Garner, 73 B.R. 26 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987)).
226. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 657.
227. Id. (citing In re Garner, 881 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1989)).
228. Id. (citing In re Garner, 881 F.2d at 581).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 657.
232. Id. at 657-58.
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trine of collateral estoppel.233 The Court found that if the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard applies to the question of
nondischargeability, the bankruptcy court could give collateral
affect to those issues that had been established and litigated in the
prior action.2 34 On the other hand, if the clear and convincing
standard applies to nondischargeability, a prior judgment cannot
be given the collateral effect. 235 Although the debtor had argued
that the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code supported a
conclusion that clear and convincing evidence standards should be
applied, the Court noted that an "'honest but unfortunate
debtor'" is entitled to a fresh start, and that a debtor that perpe-
trates a fraud is clearly not entitled to that same presumption.23 6
Thus, the Court concluded that "[r]equiring the creditor to estab-
lish by a mere preponderance of the evidence that his claim is not
dischargeable reflects a fair balance between these conflicting
interests '237 and would be consistent with both the state court liti-
gation on the matter and the issue of collateral estoppel.238
The Court noted that Congress had not clearly set out a
heightened standard for nondischargeability, and there were
many federal law examples in which the mere preponderance of
the evidence standard was required only in fraud cases.239 Most
notably, the Court found that Congress chose the preponderance
of evidence standard to govern the lack of discharge in cases in
which fraud is committed on the bankruptcy court by a debtor.24 °
Finally, the Court noted that it was not persuaded by the
Eighth Circuit's finding that courts must effectuate the fresh start
policy of the Bankruptcy Code for the debtor. The Court stated
that the debtor was not entitled to a fresh start as a matter of a
constitutional right and that although an honest debtor may
receive a fresh start, a dishonest debtor may not be entitled to the
same benefit of the doubt.
Therefore, a creditor's burden of proof will be less stringent
when bringing a nondischargeability claim under § 523 for fraud
against a debtor who has acted fraudulently. In light of Grogan,
the creditor may only have to prove by a mere preponderance of
233. Id. at 658.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 659.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 658-60.
239. Id. at 660.
240. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(aX4) (1988).
188 [Vol. 69:155
1993] "PLAIN MEANING" OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
the evidence that the debtor acted fraudulently.2 4'
K. A LIQUIDATING AGENT OR TRUSTEE IN A LIQUIDATING
CHAPTER 11 PLAN MAY BE LIABLE FOR THE
PAYMENT OF ANY TAX LIABILITY INCURRED
In the seemingly innocuous decision of Holywell Corp. v.
Smith,242 the Supreme Court held that the Chapter 11 trustee,
appointed under a confirmed Chapter 11 plan to liquidate a por-
tion of the estate, must file a tax return and pay the tax on behalf of
the estate.243 In Holywell, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy. Subsequently, a consolidated liquidating plan was put
together presumably by the creditors. The plan provided for liqui-
dation of a hotel and office complex in Miami, Florida, and prop-
erty in Washington, D.C.244
The court appointed a trustee,245 Mr. Smith, to liquidate the
estate pursuant to the confirmed plan.246 The United States was a
party, but did not object to the confirmation of the plan. After
confirmation, the assets of the corporations were sold for cash in
order to retire the debt to the secured creditors.24 7 The plan
required that the debtors give up their interests in the Miami and
Washington, D.C. properties, but otherwise provided that the
debtors could stay in business. 48
After the liquidation of the property, neither the debtors nor
the trustee filed federal tax returns or paid any taxes from the
gains on sales on the bankruptcy estate's behalf.2 49 The bank-
ruptcy court declared that the trustee did not have to file the
estate's tax returns.250 The district court and the Eleventh Circuit
241. See Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 661. That evidence which may reach the level of mere
preponderance of the evidence to one bankruptcy judge may be construed as clear and
convincing evidence to another. As Judge Kroger stated in Garner, "there is no real
distinction between 'preponderance of evidence' and 'clear and convincing' as regards§ 523 litigation." Henson v. Garner (In re Garner), 73 B.R. 26, 29 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987).
Judge Kroger may be "hitting the nail right on the head" when he infers that a bankruptcy
judge may decide how the case is going to come out and simply make the evidence fit the
standard that is applied.
242. 112 S. Ct. 1021 (1992).
243. Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 112 S. Ct. 1021, 1025 (1992).
244. Id. at 1023. This Chapter 11 case was a consolidation of five different bankruptcy
cases. Id..
245. Id. at 1024. The Court did not decide whether the trustee appointed under this
factual situation was a true " 'trustee in a case under Title 11 of the United States
Code ......."Id. at 1025 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6012 (bX3)). Instead, the Court held that this
"trustee" was an "assignee" of the corporate debtors under 26 U.S.C. § 6012(bX3). Id.
246. Id. at 1024.
247. Id. at 1023.
248. Holywell, 112 S. Ct. at 1023.
249, Id. at 1024.
250, Id.
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Court of Appeals both affirmed the bankruptcy court decision.251
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 5 2
The Court held that the appointed trustee was an assignee
within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 6012(bX3), and that the trustee
was therefore required to file a tax return on behalf of the estate
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6151(a) and § 6012(bX4).253 The Court
held that it was the trustee's responsibility to file and pay for the
taxes in this liquidating case. 5 4
Creditors must be aware that if they do put together a liqui-
dating plan, creditors may be personally responsible for all tax lia-
bilities which could arise from the liquidating plan once the
liquidation occurs. Given the substantial tax liabilities that can be
incurred in today's farm bankruptcies, this could be a severe per-
sonal tax liability for any liquidating trustee.
L. THE APPLICATION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY UNDER 42
U.S.C. § 1983
In Wyatt v. Cole,25 5 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.56 Although the
debtor in Wyatt was in bankruptcy, the case did not involve issues
of bankruptcy law, but instead dealt with the question of whether
private defendants, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "for invoking
state replevin, garnishment, and attachment statutes later
declared unconstitutional are entitled to qualified immunity from
suit. 1257
The dispute arose out of a failed cattle partnership between
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Holywell, 112 S. Ct. at 1025. See 26 U.S.C. § 6012(bX4) (1988). Section 6012(bX4)
provides in part:
For Returns of Estates and Trust.
Returns of an estate, a trust, or an estate of an individual under Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code shall be made by the fiduciary
thereof.
Id.
Section 6151(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "when a return of tax is required...
the person required to make such return shall.., pay such tax." 26 U.S.C. § 6151(a) (1988).
254. Holywell, 112 S. Ct. at 1025-26.
255. 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
256. Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1830-34 (1992). See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]very person who, under color of any
statute . . .of any State . . .subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . .to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ...
shall be subject to a cause of action." Id. The Court noted that "[t]he purpose of § 1983 is
to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their
federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails." Wyatt,
112 S. Ct. at 1830.
257. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1829.
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the petitioner Howard Wyatt and respondent Bill Cole. When no
agreement could be reached to resolve the dispute, Cole brought a
complaint for replevin against Wyatt and filed a replevin bond.258
At that time, Mississippi law allowed an individual to obtain a
court order and seize property possessed by another person by
posting a bond and swearing that the applicant was entitled to that
property.259 Later, the statute was declared unconstitutional and
Wyatt sued Cole and his attorney, Robbins, alleging a violation of
his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court declared
the statute unconstitutional because it violated Wyatt's due pro-
cess rights while granting qualified immunity to Cole and Robbins.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed. 6 °
The sole question before the Supreme Court was "[w]hether
private persons, who conspire with state officials to violate consti-
tutional rights, have available the good faith immunity applicable
to public officials." 26' The Court was referring to Cole and his
attorney, Robbins, who conspired to replevy property by use of a
statute which was later declared unconstitutional. The Court
noted that private individuals were not going to be treated simi-
larly to public servants who rely on state laws which they did not
create and which they have no reason to believe would be invalid.
The Court held that such interests were not sufficiently similar to
the traditional purposes of qualified immunity to justify such an
exception.262 The Court found, however, that it did not foreclose
the possibility that private defendants faced with § 1983 actions
may be entitled to affirmative defenses based on good faith or
probable cause, or that § 1983 suits against private parties could
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1834.
262. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1833. The Supreme Court held that qualified immunity
strikes a balance between compensating those who have been injured by official misconduct
and protecting the traditional functions of government. Id. The Supreme Court noted that
it had, in the past, recognized qualified immunity for government officials when it was
necessary to preserve the government's ability to serve the public and insure that talented
individuals would take up those actions which serve the public good without being deterred
by the threat of damages. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that "a qualified immunity
recognized.., acts to safeguard government, and thereby to protect the public at large, not
benefit its agents." Id. The Court stated "[t]hese rationales are not transferable to private
parties. Although principals of equality and fairness may suggest, as respondent's argue,
that private citizens who rely unsuspectingly on state laws they did not create and may
have no reason to believe are invalid should have some protection from liability, as do their
government counterparts, such interests are not sufficiently similar to the traditional
purposes of qualified immunity to justify such an expansion." Id.
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require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens. 63
The Court remanded the case to the district court in order to
decide the issue of whether Cole and Robbins, invoking the state
replevin statute, acted under the color of state law.264 Therefore,
when a party acts under color of state law to replevin, garnish, or
collect property under a statute which the party knows may be
unconstitutional, that party is moving forward at its own risk since
it may not have the defense of qualified immunity available for a
subsequent § 1983 action.
M. INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS ISSUED BY A DISTRICT
COURT SITTING AS A COURT OF APPEALS IN
BANKRUPTCY ARE APPEALABLE PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C. § 1291
In Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,265 the Supreme
Court addressed the appellate jurisdiction of the district court on
interlocutory appeals.266 In Germain, the debtor originally filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 1984, but the case was subse-
quently converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 267 Connecticut
National Bank (CNB) was a successor in interest to one of the
debtor's creditors, and respondent, Thomas Germain, was the
trustee of the estate. 268 The trustee sued CNB in state court, alleg-
ing lender liability against the bank for various torts and contract
breaches.269 CNB removed the action to the United States Dis-
trict Court, which then referred the matter to the bankruptcy
court. The trustee then filed a demand for a jury trial. CNB
moved to strike the demand for a jury trialY.2 7  The bankruptcy
court denied CNB's motion, and the district court affirmed. CNB
tried to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, whereby the circuit court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
263. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). In Lugar, the Supreme
Court considered the scope of § 1983 liability in the context of garnishment, pre-judgment
attachment, and replevin actions. The Supreme Court held that private parties who attach
a debtor's assets pursuant to a state attachment statute were subject to § 1983 liability if the
statute was constitutionally infirm. Id. at 942. The Supreme Court noted that these types of
cases-garnishment, prejudgment attachment, and replevin-established that private use
of state laws to secure property could constitute "state action" for the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that private defendants invoking state created attachment
statutes "under the color of state law" were within the meaning of § 1983 if their actions
were fairly attributable to the state. Id.
264. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942.
265. 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992).
266. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1148 (1992).
267. Id. at 1147-48.
268. Id. at 1148.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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over the appeal.2 71 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed. 2
The majority opinion2 73 noted that the interlocutory orders of
the United States District Court are subject to review only under
28 U.S.C. § 1292.4 The trustee contended that § 1292 did not
apply because Congress limited its scope when it enacted 28
U.S.C. § 158(d). 275 The bankruptcy court held that a "plain read-
ing" of 11 U.S.C. § 158(d) did not limit the scope of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292. 27
The Court observed that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292 over-
lapped with 11 U.S.C. § 158(d); however, "[r]edundancies across
statutes are not unusual events in drafting, and so long as there is
no 'positive repugnancy' between two laws, a court must give
effect to both.12 77 The Court noted that while courts should disfa-
vor interpretations which render some language of a statute super-
fluous, that canon did not apply, or even if it did apply it was "no
more than [a] rule[ ] of thumb" which helped courts determine
the meaning of the legislation. 8
The Court refused to consider the issue of legislative history
and concluded that "[w]e have stated time and again that courts
271. Germain, 112 S. Ct. at 1148.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1147. Five Justices joined in the majority opinion: Justices Thomas,
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. Justice Stevens filed a separate concurring opinion
as did Justices O'Connor, White, and Blackmun. Id.
274. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1988). Section 1292 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) [T]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
1. Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States ... or of
the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving
injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court;
2. Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up
receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes therefore ... ;
3. Interlocutory orders of such district courts or of the judges thereof
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which
appeals from final decrees are allowed.
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such
order. The court of appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such
action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order, if application is made to it within 10 days after entry of the order.
Id.
275. Germain, 112 S. Ct. at 1148. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). Section 158(d)
provides, in pertinent part: "[T]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b) of
this section." Id.
276. Germain, 112 S. Ct. at 1148.
277. Id. at 1149 (citations omitted).
278. Id.
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must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there. '2 79 The Court noted that
"[n]owhere does § 1292 limit review to orders issued by district
courts sitting as trial courts in bankruptcy rather than appellate
courts, and nowhere else, whether in § 158(d) or any other statute,
has Congress indicated that the unadorned words of § 1292 are in
some way limited by implication."2 ' Thus, the Court held that
the Second Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the case because 28
U.S.C. § 158 does not displace 28 U.S.C. § 1292.
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, indicated that it
might be prudent to consider the legislative history; however,
even after considering legislative history in this case, there was no
indication that Congress intended to limit the scope of
§ 1292(b).211 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and
Blackmun, also concurred, and stating that the rules of statutory
construction should have been applied and the court should have
noted that its interpretation "does render § 158(d) largely superflu-
ous." 282 Further, the concurring opinion indicated that Congress,
in all likelihood, inadvertently created the redundancy, that Con-
gress' inadvertence should be overlooked, and the statute should
be interpreted so that the long-standing rule of appellate jurisdic-
tion over interlocutory appeals in bankruptcy cases is
maintained.8 3
III. PENDING SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The following cases are bankruptcy-related cases that are cur-
rently pending before the. United States Supreme Court on certio-
rari. Presumably, these cases will be decided by the Court next
term.
A. DOES THE "FILED RATE" DOCTRINE ASSIST THE
TRUSTEE IN COLLECTION OF MOTOR CARRIER
UNDERCHARGES?
In In re Carolina Motor Express, Inc. ,284 the Supreme Court is
asked to consider whether a trustee can collect undercharges of a
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1150.
281. Germain, 112 S. Ct. at 1150 (Stevens, J., concurring).
282. Id. at 1151 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
283. Id.
284. 949 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nom., Reiter v. Cooper, 112 S. Ct.
1934 (1992).
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debtor motor carrier.28 This case involves the requirements
under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq.,
1982, which requires motor carriers to file their rates with the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and that both the ship-
pers and the carriers adhere to those rates. This requirement is
the so-called "filed rate" doctrine.2 86 In Carolina, the trustee for
the debtor motor carrier seeks to recover those undercharges
which occurred on a privately negotiated contract between the
shipper and the motor carrier.287 The trustee filed two adversary
actions in the bankruptcy court in order to collect the
undercharges from different shippers. The bankruptcy court held
that the trustee for the carrier debtor was entitled to recover irre-
spective of any equitable defenses and irrespective of its own
actions.288 On appeal, the district court reversed the bankruptcy
court and referred the matter to the ICC on the question of
whether the carrier's collection of undercharges would amount to
an unreasonable practice.289 The carrier appealed to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
In a third and separate action, the district court withdrew ref-
erence from the bankruptcy court and referred the matter to the
ICC. The ICC decided that the carrier's collection of
undercharges constituted an unreasonable practice. Based on the
ICC's findings, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant carrier, thereby dismissing plaintiff's
action. The plaintiff debtor appealed the district court's decision
to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 90 The Fourth Circuit
reversed, ordered the district court to reinstate the decisions of
the bankruptcy court, and ordered that judgment be entered in
favor of the plaintiff on a separate case in which the district court
had withdrawn reference. 29 ' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
The Fourth Circuit did not set forth the exact factual scenario
of the parties in its opinion, but cited to the Fifth Circuit's presen-
tation of a similar factual scenario. The Fourth Circuit stated that
"the Fifth Circuit aptly described the present scenario as follows:
285. In re Carolina Motor Express, Inc., 949 F.2d 107, 108 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. granted
sub nom., Reiter v. Cooper, 112 S. Ct. 1934 (1992).
286. Id. at 110.
287. Id. at 108.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Carolina Motor Express, 949 F.2d at 108.
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'The well-worn choreography for these cases involves a
motor carrier's action against a shipper to collect for
undercharges; that is, to collect the difference between
the higher rate which the carrier has filed with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission... and the rate which the
parties had negotiated.' "292
Under 49 U.S.C. § 10761, a motor carrier subject to the Interstate
Commerce Act" 'may not charge or receive a different compensa-
tion for... transportation or service than the rate specified in the
tariff' filed with the ICC." The Interstate Commerce Act also
specifies that "'[a] rate, classification, rule, or practice related to
transportation or service provided by a carrier . . . must be
reasonable.' "293
The Court has most recently re-emphasized the importance of
this "file rate" doctrine as "essential to preventing price discrimi-
nation and stabilizing rates."' 294 The defendants in Carolina Motor
Express argued that the carrier's attempt to collect undercharges
was an unreasonable practice under the Act.295 After Maislin
Industries, US., Inc., v. Primary Steel,296 this argument was clearly
rejected by the Supreme Court. Next, the defendants argued that
notwithstanding its decision in Maislin, the Supreme Court should
remand the cases "to the district court with instructions to refer
them to the ICC for determination of the reasonableness of the
carrier's filed tariff rates. '297 The Court found that the reasonable-
ness of the rates may be contested by the defendants. However,
the court indicated that the Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue of whether the ICC should, at the first instance, decide the
reasonableness of the rates. 298 The Court stated "Maislin . .. did
mention in a footnote that the issue of rate reasonableness was not
presented in the case and would be 'open for exploration' on
remand. ' 299 The court believed that a
defense attacking the reasonableness of a carrier's filed
rates should not operate to stay enforcement of the filed
rate doctrine. Rather, shippers must pay the filed rates
292. Id. at 109 (quoting Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. Yaquinto, 864 F.2d 388, 388-
89 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3254 (1990)).
293. Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. §§ 10701(a), 10761(a)).
294. Maislin Indus. U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2766 (1990).
295. Carolina Motor Express, 949 F.2d at 109.
296. 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 110.
299. Id.
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and contest those filed rates before the ICC indepen-
dently if they wish to seek reparations from the carrier.
We believe that such an approach is preferable to an
alternative procedure under which the courts would
automatically refer cases to the ICC whenever a rate was
challenged. This alternative approach would provide a
strong incentive for shippers routinely to contest the
validity of the carrier's rates in order to delay paying the
carrier's filed rate. Such a situation would be wholly
inconsistent with a filed rate doctrine.3 ° °
The appellate court concluded that it would not delay
enforcement of a judgment to turn over the property as the ship-
pers are charged with knowledge of the filed rate and can contest
its reasonableness with the ICC at any time. 30 ' The court noted
that its rule in no way forecloses the shipper from raising the issue
of reasonableness with the ICC at a later date and potentially
recovering the money.30 2 However, the court would not delay the
process and ordered the shipper to pay the filed rate as provided
in the judgments. 3
The sole issue on certiorari is whether the debtor carrier can
collect the undercharges. This case does not inVolve issues of
bankruptcy law per se, but rather will be more of an interpreta-
tion of motor carrier law. It was only raised because the debtor
filed for bankruptcy and brought an action to collect
undercharges. However, there have been several Chapter 7 cases
in which trustees have been trying to collect undercharges. Con-
sequently, this decision will have an impact on those actions.
B. CAN THE "BAR DATE" TO FILE CLAIMS BE EXTENDED
AFTER IT HAS EXPIRED?
In re Pioneer Investment Services Co. 304 involved a Chapter 11
bankruptcy case of an untimely filed proof of claim. In Pioneer,
the creditor alleged excusable neglect and moved for an extension
of the "bar date" 305 after untimely filing proofs of claims.30 6 The
300. Id.
301. Carolina Motor Express, 949 F.2d at 110.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 111.
304. 943 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nom., Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v.
Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 112 S. Ct. 2963 (1992).
305. The "bar date" is the last date set by the Court to timely file proofs of claims.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(cX3). One court has suggested that the phrase "bar date" is a
misnomer, in that claims are not barred past this date, they are just treated differently than
197
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debtor in Pioneer filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy on
April 12, 1989. At the same time, the debtor filed a list of its
twenty largest unsecured creditors which included Brunswick
Associates Limited Partnership (Brunswick), Clinton Associates
Limited Partnership (Clinton), and West Knoxville Associates Lim-
ited Partnership (West Knoxville). Pioneer requested an extension
of time to file its schedules; the extension was granted through
May 17, 1989.307
On April 13, 1989, the Notice of First Meeting of Creditors
was mailed by the bankruptcy clerk's office, setting May 5, 1989, as
the date for the meeting to be held under § 341(a).308 This notice
also set the bar date for filing proofs of claims as August 3, 1989.309
The notice contained a statement in conformity with 11 U.S.C.
§ 1111 and Bankruptcy Rule 3003, that proofs of claims must be
filed "if your claim is scheduled as disputed, contingent or unliqui-
dated, is unlisted or you do not agree with the amount. 310
The bankruptcy court determined that Mark A. Berlin, Presi-
dent of Robriste Enterprises, Inc., a general partner of Clinton,
West Knoxville, and Brunswick, received and read the April 13th
notice.31 1 The bankruptcy court also found that Mr. Berlin was an
experienced businessman engaged in real estate financial matters,
a certified public accountant, and an attorney licensed to practice
in Florida and New York.31 '2 The bankruptcy court further found
that Berlin attended and participated in the May 5th meeting of
creditors. 31 3 The schedules were timely filed, and the creditors
were not listed; however, on May 25th, Pioneer amended its
schedules and included the creditors involved in this action, hold-
ing that their claims were contingent, unliquidated, and dis-
timely filed claims. See In re Hausladen, 146 B.R. 557, 559 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992). The
court in Hausladen stated:
All of this has been compounded by attorneys, judges and commentators who
have carried forward the old Act habit of referring to the date set for filing
claims as the "bar date." Under Section 57(n) of the Act it was a bar date;
however under section 502 of the Code it is not. Continued mischaracterization
of the time period has led to reliance on the words themselves without actually
understanding them or what the statute actually says.
Id.
306. In re Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co., 943 F.2d 673, 675 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub
nom., Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 112 S. Ct. 2963 (1992).
307. Id. at 674.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 675.
310. Id.
311. Pioneer Inv., 943 F.2d at 675.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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puted.3 4  The creditor, Ft. Oglethorpe Associates Limited
Partnership (Ft. Oglethorpe), was not listed as a creditor in either
filing. Berlin was also the President of Pudding Enterprises, which
was the general partner of Ft. Oglethorpe. The United States
Trustee's Office appointed Clinton as a member of the creditors'
committee. Berlin, representing Clinton, was a member on that
committee.3 1 5
Thereafter, the creditors retained Marc Richards as their legal
counsel. Mr. Richards, as the bankruptcy court found, was an
experienced bankruptcy attorney. 6  The testimony indicated
that Richards advised Berlin that there was no bar date in the file,
and therefore, "filing proofs of claim was not a matter of
urgency.
317
On August 23, 1989, twenty days after the expiration of the
bar date, the creditors filed, and Mr. Berlin signed their proofs of
claim.318 The creditors acknowledged that they filed untimely
claims, but asked that their claims be allowed because of excusable
neglect or, in the alternative, that they be allowed nunc pro tunc
to the bar date. 19 The bankruptcy court denied their motion to
file their claims after the bar date.32' The creditors appealed to
the district court which accepted all of the bankruptcy court's
findings, but found that the bankruptcy court had applied an
overly strict interpretation of the excusable neglect standard.
Consequently, the district court remanded for a more liberal inter-
pretation. 2 ' On remand, the bankruptcy court found that, even
under a more liberal interpretation of excusable neglect, there was
no basis for allowing the claims after the bar date.322 The creditors
again appealed.32 3 The district court affirmed, and the creditors
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Pioneer Inv., 943 F.2d at 675.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(bX1) allows for an extension of time if the request is
made prior to the expiration of the original period. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(bX1).
Alternatively, a motion may be made after the expiration of the specified time period
within which to act if the failure to act was the result of an excusable neglect. Id. Excusable
neglect is not defined in the Code. Pioneer Inv., 943 F.2d at 676. Under a strict
interpretation of excusable neglect, it would have to be established that the failure to act
was caused by circumstances beyond one's control. Id. A more lenient reading of the
standard of excusable neglect would lead one to consider various other factors, including
prejudice to the parties, prejudice to the plaintiff, merits of the defendant's defenses, and
any exculpable conduct on the part of the defendant in determining what satisfies good
cause or the excusable neglect standard. Id. at 676-77.
320. Pioneer Inv., 943 F.2d at 675.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.324
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that § 1111(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code required creditors to file proofs of claims if their
claims are "scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated. ''1 25
The creditors acknowledged that Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)
required the court to set a time in which proofs may be filed, and
provided that an extension of time may be granted "for cause
shown. ' 326 The court noted that Bankruptcy Rule 3003 should be
read in conjunction with Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)--which allows a
court to extend the time to act.327 The court indicated that Rule
9006 provided that a period of time may be extended even after
the expiration of that time for "excusable neglect. 328
The bankruptcy court, adopting the Eleventh Circuit stan-
dard, held that the strict reading of excusable neglect requires an
application of excusable neglect only when the failure to perform
the act was due to "circumstances beyond the reasonable control
of the party. '3 29 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that on
the first appeal, the district court had correctly analyzed the stan-
dard because it applied a more liberal standard of excusable
neglect with a more "textured" approach. 330 The court agreed
with the Ninth Circuit's standard in the case of In re Dix23 3' a
more liberal approach.332 The district court remanded the matter
to the bankruptcy court to consider the Dix standards. The bank-
ruptcy court, applying the more liberal Dix standards, found that
relief was not appropriate.333 However, the circuit court found
that the bankruptcy court, even though it applied the factors cor-
rectly, had inappropriately penalized the plaintiffs for the errors of
their counsel.334
The circuit court noted that Official Bankruptcy Form 16 pro-
vided for a model form to give creditors notice with respect to
what a bar date means, and the impact of that bar date.335 The
court also noted that the forms sent out by the clerk's office in this
case were ambiguous in that they contained merely an inconspicu-
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ously labeled bar date without any reference to the significance of
what the date meant.33 6 The court opined that only parties with
extensive experience in bankruptcy would have known what the
term "bar date" meant.337 The circuit court said that the creditors
in this case should not be "unjustifiably punished.., for the sins
and neglect of their lawyer. ' 33 8 Thus, the Court held that the
claims would be allowed as timely filed.339 The Dix standard justi-
fied the excusable neglect relief sought.34 °
It will be interesting to see how the Supreme Court will deal
with this case, given its strict constructionist, plain meaning inter-
pretation of the Code. It is almost certain that Justice Scalia will
vote to reverse the decision, strictly applying the language of the
statute, and determining that any claims filed late are untimely.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has taken the position of reviewing cases
in which there is a conflict in the circuits, in order that the applica-
tion of bankruptcy law is uniform. The judicial pronouncements,
although not as comprehensive as the legislative changes in the
past, have still had a dramatic impact on the application of bank-
ruptcy law. The Court has clarified some bankruptcy issues and
has created additional issues. What can fairly be said, however, is
that the Court is going to strictly construe all statutory interpreta-
tions, or rely on, in Justice Scalia's words-The Plain Meaning of
the Code.
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